

The Terrorizing Crises Of A Developing Nation State

By Raheem ul Haque

While the last 30 years have seen direct imperialistic presence in this region, domineering waves have long been blowing across these lands with grand designs of regional and world dominance, leading to concepts of Buffer State and unnatural colonial boundaries. Add to it two sworn rival states of recent history, their unresolved territorial disputes, State sponsored social conditioning and their enmity raised to the platform of a religious existential conflict eventually leading to internal social upheavals.

It is now a stated fact that the Afghan Taliban were given sanctuary in Quetta and Chaman, Pakistan after their fall post American invasion in 2001. In addition, for the first time in Pakistan's history, a multiparty religious alliance formed the provincial government in two provinces bordering Afghanistan in the 2002 elections held under the auspices of the military regime. Afghan Taliban were asked to lay low for a year or so before starting their operations again in Afghanistan. While NATO forces pressured the Pakistan Army (PA) to remove command & control centers of the Taliban in Quetta, this pressure was relieved by delivering Al Qaeda members to the US from time to time. Ahmad Rashid argues that PakArmy's sharing of intelligence with the US regarding some of the Afghan Taliban targets started only after PakArmy received heavy casualties from the Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP – PakTaliban), the umbrella organization of a loose alliance of about forty regional commanders headed by Baitullah Mehsud (including Fazlullah of Swat) with the total strength of about 40,000 fighters and arguably connected to most Al-Qaeda attacks on European targets since 9/11. The TTP sprung out of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), the area bordering Tora Bora where Al-Qaeda leadership had slipped to after American invasion. Additionally the same area had been a meeting ground for International Islamists (use Islam as a political slogan with the goal of creating a theocratic state) fighters from around the world in the 1980s, some settling after the 80s Afghan war. The Drone attacks started only after Musharraf accepted American pressure to allow setting up a CIA cell in FATA in January 2008 after the Americans had completely lost trust in intelligence sharing with Pakistan's intelligence agencies. Additionally, the PakArmy while supporting the Afghan Taliban has conducted large scale operations against PakTaliban (TTP) after its own soldiers, settled cities and large urban centres came under attack.¹

Rashid also states that TTP is loosely linked to the Afghan Taliban. But usual army narrative in Pakistan media states that the TTP is working against the Afghan Taliban and is funded by anti-Pakistan forces including India and the US. Without privy to intelligence reports, it is any one's guess who is supporting who and using who as all of the world's intelligence agencies are currently doing double duty along the Pak-Afghan border and adjacent regions. While the PakArmy still considers Afghan Taliban as a strategic asset (Gen Kayani has been phone tapped calling Haqqani, an Afghan commander aligned with the Taliban as a strategic asset) for the post American Afghan scenario assuming Americans will leave in a couple of years. Will it support a group aligned with the AfghanTaliban in FATA or one against it? Additionally being a party to the war in Afghanistan by supporting American logistically on the one hand and the AfghanTaliban on the other, is it willing to accept millions homeless (the heartless term being collateral damage) and mini states of TTP in Pakistan? Accepting Shariah demands and giving up space to Fazlullah in Swat through the recent peace agreement could not have come about if he had not been allowed to build up a base through an illegal radio station for the last 5 years, indicating either an utter incompetence on the part of intelligence (Inter-Services Intelligence – ISI, Military Intelligence – MI, Intelligence Bureau – IB) or its collusion. In FATA, PakArmy has been engaged in large scale operations against TTP in addition to

¹ Descent into Chaos, Ahmed Rashid (Viking , 2008)

‘American’ Drone attacks (which fly from Shamsie Air Field, 190 miles Southwest of Quetta under a joint Pak-American command). To an informed observer, it seems that PakArmy either has some complex strategy playing both sides of the aisle or its enmeshed in its own incoherence unable to differentiate between enemies and friends in this complex regional war.

Scenarios: Facts spawn speculation...

A number of theses make their way around the rumor mill. The first assumes that Pak-Army and ISI are professional top down organizations and the PakArmy-ISI strategic game lies at the root of the current crises. While the PakArmy went through a shopping spree of \$3.8Billion in 2003 and another \$6B in 2006, it still argues that Fazlullah’s radio station is too complex to shut down & requires expensive equipment not available to the Army. Similarly, the PakArmy has launched operations in Khyber, Mohmand, Bajaur, North & South Warizistan Agencies (FATA) but not a single leader of the Pak-Taliban (TTP) has been killed or arrested. Spokesperson for Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) has publicly stated that Baitullah Mehsud was within the reach of PakArmy multiple times but orders were to leave him alone. A Malik (the traditional leadership tier of Pushtun tribes) from Mohmand agency that I met recently stated that only the civilians get killed in Army operations, even though the army knows the position of the PakTaliban. A few thousand PakTaliban continue to assassinate Maliks and have taken tribes of hundreds of thousand hostage, because they are supported by a such larger force, which chooses to stay under cover.

Accordingly, the army while supporting the Afghan Taliban does not want to eradicate TTP (Fazlullah & others) because it needs a line of defense against foreign forces in Afghanistan which can only be provided by militant Islamists. Some of these Assets (an intelligence term) may have independent interests being funded by multiple sources but ISI would rather bring them under its own umbrella instead of liquidating them because of the alternative- Glasnost. The PakArmy has always considered the Awami National Party (ANP), a Pushtun nationalist party which currently runs the province and was even against the 1980s Afghan Jihad² of the fundamentalist forces, as traitors. Thus conditions were created to force their surrender to Islamists. It is the very government of this most secular, nationalist party of the country which after winning the 2008 elections has signed a peace agreement with Islamist terrorists of Swat, primarily because 85% of Swat was already controlled by Fazlullah’s black turbans³; 100+ activists of ANP, Swat and a member of their provincial assembly were killed while multiple unsuccessful suicide attempts were made against their president and senior ministers. With police force in complete disarray and no help from the army, self preservation required a peace agreement. Within this framework, the Indian embassy bombing in Afghanistan had an ISI connection and later Mumbai attack was carried out by the Lashkar-e-Taeba, the non-state militant wing of the ISI to warn both India and Israel to curtail activities in Afghanistan and stop supporting anti-State militancy in Pakistan (Baluchistan and FATA). Additionally it pushed back Pak-India peace a few years disallowing internal state restructuring (policy & budget) by the new civilian government, after the most capable and internationally recognized political leader had already been removed from the scene. When the international and US pressure on Pakistan became intense post Mumbai massacre, the Taliban burnt NATO convoys in Peshawar on two consecutive days leading to a more subdued US response.

² Jihad – fighting in the name of Allah is part of the Islamic discourse. The Quran considers Jihad with oneself (one’s ego) as a higher form of jihad compared to the external jihad which is primarily for self-defense but throughout Muslim history slogan of Jihad has both been used for self-defense as well as for aggression.

³ Fluttering Flags of Jihad, Amir Mir (Mashal, 2009)

The second thesis argues that though the Pak-Army still provides logistics support to the Afghan Taliban, it is a sworn enemy of the TTP which is a mishmash of puritan Taliban, social dropouts and Indian-US-Israel planted assets. But its lackluster achievement in apprehending TTP leaders – Baitullah, Fazlullah, MangalBagh are because of its ideological and familial limitations. The PakArmy was trained to fight the Hindu. As all promotional and morale raising material including slogans are coaxed in religious terms, it is very hard for the army to fight fellow Muslim brethren especially when the other fights in the name of religion. The other aspect being that Pushtun (making up 14%+ of the army and all of Frontier Constabulary) members of the same tribe or even family could be fighting on both sides of the divide – PakArmy vs the PakTaliban. It argues that just like a split Pakistani public opinion with few voices openly critical of Islamist militants and Jihadis (militant Islamist), there have been large desertions in the army for fighting the PakTaliban. Additionally it argues that the army can not take action against PakTaliban without strong public support which tends to blame the army for killing its own people and for fighting an American war.

The third thesis argues that there is a rift in the PakArmy with sections supporting the American position and the other Islamists. The ISI, responsible for strategic decision making (Military Intelligence - MI is more tactical) has rogue elements aligned with the militant Islamists while being given cover by the Islamist wing of the army. It is these very elements who have been instrumental for the Mumbai mayhem because they wanted PakArmy to give space to the TTP in Western Pakistan as tensions with India would have required moving army to the East. A similar action was taken in Dec 2001 when the Indian parliament was attacked prompting massing of Indian troops on Pakistan's Eastern border requiring Pakistan to move its troops from the Afghan front to the East. While working with the Islamic fighters (mujahideen) since the 80s, these elements have become one with the likes of Al-Qaeda (an Internationalist Militant Islamist group) and have been instrumental in providing weapons to Red Mosque clerics (the mosque where army quelled an insurrection) in Islamabad and militants in Swat while convincing the rest of the army not to take action against them till these assets became a threat to the army or State's international relations. The recent assassination of a retired army general Faisal Alavi⁴, who had earlier been disgracefully dismissed because he had complained to the Army Chief regarding peace deals made by two Generals with TTP's Baitullah Mehsud fits either the first or the third theses.

The last thesis argues that though PakArmy was instrumental in creating the Jihadi infrastructure, the genie is now out of the bottle and beyond the control of PakArmy which is trying its best to curtail it. PakArmy did its best to manage the situation by having peace pacts with the militants to curtail them in a specific area. But that was not acceptable to the master, the Americans who feel that peace in Pakistan would only shift Jihadis to fight NATO forces in Afghanistan. America dictates Pakistan's overt policy because they fund PakArmy militarily, train military officers and provide much needed bilateral loans, through IMF, World Bank and sponsorship of international donor conferences. Every time the situation calms down in conflict ridden areas (FATA, Swat) through an agreement with the PakTaliban, American voices force the PakArmy to conduct an ill planned military operation leading to large scale human displacement and destruction. This further helps build support for the PakTaliban among the population as the ordinary people want peace even at the expense of sacrificing some of their freedoms. Especially if the military operation owing to incompetence (PakArmy's lack of anti-insurgent training and experience in fighting a gorilla army. Additionally it assumes PakArmy has changed its policy of supporting non-state actors for Afghanistan and Kashmir) or half heartedness (an

⁴ The General had written a letter to Gen Kayani arguing that the earlier army chief's decision to dismiss him was at the behest of two generals who had made deals with the PakTaliban. He asked the new chief for an honorable discharge while asking a journalist to his letter public if he was harmed. He was assassinated in November 2008 in Rawalpindi.

American dictated operation only requires making claims of killing appropriate number of ‘militants’ depending upon which American official is visiting or who made the statement) does not lead to removal of PakTaliban elements. So when the army retreats after the operation leaving the people on their own, the Taliban come back with an increased vengeance targeting all those who had earlier supported the Army operation against them. PakTaliban have killed close to 300 Maliks in FATA, almost eradicating the historical power structure of the region. Belonging to the lower classes, they have also taken some land distribution initiatives to build support among the dispossessed.

Though there is room for other theses, the key players among all are the same i.e. the PakArmy and the militant Islamist organizations which combine militancy and fundamentalist religious ideology for their political ends. These Jihadi organizations are not restricted to the periphery of FATA or Swat but can be found across Pakistan including the intellectual heart of Pakistan, the Punjab University (PU) in Lahore. The largest university in the country has been controlled by Jamiat (Student wing of the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami). Last year when its hold on power was challenged by a peaceful student group, a large number of Jamiat activists (mostly non-university students) performed ablution, convinced themselves of going on jihad (religious war) and then shot two university students followed by slogans of ‘God is great’ and ‘Jamiat is Alive’. Planning of the shooting had taken place in a teacher’s house on campus, which happened to be of the father-in-law of one of the shooters. The culprits still roam free on bail as no action was taken by the Chief Minister whose centre right party is politically aligned with the JI. Jamiat thus rules in the name of God categorically stating in a discussion that ‘Jamiat would not allow any other student group even if this group wanted to distribute the Quran on campus’.

This condoning of militancy and terror in the name of religion not just requires political expediency/interests but also a certain level of conditioning of society as well as the taming of alternative views. Thus it is important to note that along with the rise of militant Islamist groups, social mores of Pakistani society have also changed. The dominant farewell greeting 30 years ago was ‘Khuda Hafiz’ (May God keep you secure) which has now changed to ‘Allah Hafiz’ (May Allah keep you secure) thus restricting it only to the Muslim God. Institutional impact of religiosity can be judged by the outlook of the last national cricket team, the most popular sport with players belonging to all social classes. Increased irrational religiosity, increase in bearded players and conversion of a Christian player to Islam eventually cumulated in Pakistani team’s higher interest in proselytizing (tableegh) than playing cricket leading to its worst ever performance in country’s World Cup history. A more personal example came in a tour of Ghulam Ishaq Khan University (GIK), a premiere engineering school of the country where I made a recruiting trip in 2004. During the university’s marketing session, a senior professor rather than mentioning the number of labs, caliber of students, success of alumni instead took great pride in telling the audience that last year a foreign student had converted to Islam at the behest of faculty and students. Another example is the festival of Basant, the largest kite flying festival in which millions participated which was banned last year because the kite flying thread led to more than 10 deaths. But more popularly, it was the Islamists’ branding of the festival as Hindu primarily because it was a popular secular festival that led to a subdued public reaction on the ban. Even the liberals rather than critiquing the government to regulate the thread instead harped on the death count ignoring Islamists’ ulterior agenda. That 140,000 people die in Pakistan every year because of diarrhea – lack of clean water and millions because of other cure able diseases does not lead to closing of industries spreading pollutants.

The reaction of authorities responsible for law and order is even worse. Acting against the recent phoned threat to CD shops in Lahore, the administration officer created a pile of ‘vulger’ CDs in the middle of the market and set them on fire. Similarly while speaking to the media after low intensity

blasts outside a theatre, the Chief Minister of Punjab talked more about stopping vulgarity⁵ in theatre plays with a few passing remarks against terrorism. It is this very mind set that is a hurdle in forming public opinion against militant Islamism, taken to the extent that people even refuse to acknowledge that suicide bombings and terrorism are being conducted by Muslims instead considering them a conspiracy to disgrace Islam.

80s and the evolution of non-state militant actors

Islamist gains politically can not be judged independently of the socio-cultural gains made by the religious orthodoxy (a term encapsulating fundamentalism) both increasing sympathy for Political Islam as well as decreasing influence of progressive elements. Most link it to political change through the 1977 military coup which brought a fundamentalist military dictator into power. With no manifesto to govern, the dictator used the Islamic mantra. Following a change in his destiny when he became the savior against the 'evil' Soviet Union among the 'enlightened' West, he went about inserting fundamentalist reading of Sunni Islam – particularly Deobandi in the education curriculum, legal statues and incentivized religiosity in state institutions. He changed the motto of the Army from 'Unity, Faith, Discipline' to 'Iman, Taqwa, Jihad fi Sabeenlilah' (Faith, Obedience to God, Struggle in the path of Allah) in 1976. He even allowed Islamic fundamentalists to preach at the military academy and added moral and religious behavior in the Annual Confidential Report of military officers⁶ though this was removed after his death. But the PakArmy has since been groomed to defend not just the territorial but also the ideological frontiers of the State. 80s Afghan war also was instrumental in bringing together a coalition of Pakistani State power, militant fundamentalist ideology (supported by Western powers, the US provided logistics including literature & arms while Saudis matched with funds – \$80 billion for institutionalizing the most extreme Islamic fundamentalist ideology, Wahabism in this region) and non-state actors to evolve a modern militant Islamist fundamentalist phenomena later to be called Al-Qaeda, Taliban, Hizb, Jaish and Lashkar. Though Islamists had long existed in Pakistani society as a genuine political option, but with State as an active patron, they became increasingly powerful forcing their ideology in universities, on media and spheres of public expression leading to a society conditioned on a singular religious identity based on Islamist interpretation of Islam. The current Taliban phenomena is only an extension of the earlier Islamists who have now been left behind by the new generation of militants who want to impose by force what the earlier Islamists couldn't do through political means.

The other big event was the 1979 Iranian Revolution which shook the status quo in the Muslim world giving confidence especially to the Shia Muslim community who had long been persecuted across the Muslim world where they were a minority. This further enhanced the religious identity giving rise to religion based political activism in Pakistan to counter the Sunni fundamentalist dictatorship. Thus as State policy of 'Islamization' and religiosity progressed, so did the sectarian fissures later giving rise to militant sectarian organizations allegedly supported by respective fundamentalist regimes of Iran – Shia and Saudi Arabia – Sunni-Wahabi. As the sectarian war raged in Pakistan in the 1990s, the

⁵ The Pakistani Film industry was all but destroyed during the 1980s (and has not picked up) through restrictions and censorship as well as the tax regime by the then fundamentalist military dictator. Since, most of the industry has given way to catering just for the migrant rural workers, men who are alone in the city rather than the middle classes. Cinemas have given way to Comedy Stage Dramas which use Juggat (sexual innuendoes) as well as Mujra (a sexually explicit female dance) catering only to men of all classes. This is due to the fact that all performing arts (drama, music, classical dance, film) were clamped down upon through a religious ideology leading to de-popularization of cultural art forms. Instead art forms catering to carnal needs of men gained ground because of the restricted mobility of women further segregating genders.

⁶ Crossed Swords: Pakistan, its army and the wars within, Shuja Nawaz (Oxford, 2008)

security establishment blamed it on the Indian plan to divide the Muslims, never accepting it as an overspill of State policies of jihad through non-state actors. The acceptance of anti-Shia rhetoric got to a point that a hard core anti-Shia party (with an associated militant wing) even won a seat in the national assembly winning against a Shia feudal.

Once Afghan and internationalist Jihadis were successful in Afghanistan with ISI's logistical guidance, inspired by Wahabi-Deobandi religious ideology and American weapons, the PakArmy shifted the channel to Kashmir. This led to the indigenous Kashmiri struggle of secular nationalist groups fighting for self determination being taken over by the Islamists waging a jihad in Kashmir. A Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF – a secular nationalist Kashmiri group) commander at a press conference in Dec 1991 said that "Hizbul Mujahideen (HM- an Islamist militant group supported by ISI) is not just finishing JKLF mujahideen but also informing Indian forces of their ware bouts leading to 500 martyrs of JKLF". He categorically stated that this was an ISI given task to HM because JKLF was the largest militant group that wanted an independent Kashmir.⁷ The success of the Afghan strategy had convinced Pakistani security establishment that a war it couldn't win due to India's greater military might would be turned in its favor through gorilla war waged through non-state actors. If nothing else it would bring India to the negotiating table or at least tie a good segment of Indian army in Kashmir. The strategy worked only to the extent that it bled India and tied 800,000 Indian forces in Kashmir while creating 70,000 Kashmiri graves. By one conservative estimate 30,000 Pakistani civilian died fighting in Kashmir and Afghanistan while an estimated 100,000 Pakistani civilians were given military training since the 1980s.

The extent of the Jihadi infrastructure can be conceived by looking at a larger outfit, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LT), the group earlier blamed for attack on the Indian parliament and more recently for the Mumbai massacre. It started as Jamaat udDawa Irshad (JDI) in 1986 when two Islamic studies professors belonging to Wahabi (ahle-hadith) school of thought joined the Afghan Jihad and later decided to setup LT to send youth for jihad. After setting up a training camp, LT started getting funding from the ISI, US and Saudis. Following the Afghan war, LT rather than joining the infighting among Afghan groups, took the Kashmir route in 1990. Initially LT had received recruitment support from Wahabi mosques, but this support decreased as it gained power at the expense of existing Wahabi mosques regulatory institution. JDI then setup its own institutional structure across the country which over the last two decades has grown to a 200 acre campus in Muridke (40 km from Lahore), 1150 offices across the country including 74 district offices, 200 model schools, 11 madrassas, 2 science colleges, a weekly children magazine, a English monthly journal and a monthly Urdu journal with an 80,000 circulation. It is a full fledged organization with Jihad, Teacher, Farmer & Labor, Students, Women, Publication, Heath, Education, Foreign Relations and Community Service wings, each actively promoting its ideals and recruiting in its space. In 2001, its monetary wing collected Rs 200 million (\$65 million) through various activities including the sacrificial hides donated at the Eid festival (qurbani ki khalein) valuing Rs 25 million. Could this institutional setup be created without the support or consent of the State?

On 24th Dec 2001, the JDI changed its name to Jawaat udDawa (JD) and separated itself from LT (the militant wing) as the State Bank of Pakistan sent out a circular to freeze LT's bank accounts the same day, while the Pakistan government promulgated a ban on LT on 13th January 2002, twenty days after the legal separation of funding/institutional from the militant wing. The LT camps still exist and are located in Pakistani controlled Kashmir and in interior Sindh and in total 10,000 have been trained in

⁷ Jihad-e Afghanistan aur Kashmir, Mohammad Amir Rana (Mashal, 2002)

militant activities in these camps⁸. I am an eye witness to only one JD office which was closed for three days after the recent Mumbai attack (when LT was blamed and its leadership picked up) only to reopen under the banner of Islamic Library with the Muslim pronouncement of faith (1st kalma) written on it.

The PakArmy's use of non-state actors for its policy objectives in Kashmir & Afghanistan that began in the 1980s still continues at the expense of a peaceful, democratic, liberal and progressive domestic space. Islam has been misused to brain wash canon fodder primarily coming from poor backgrounds with limited job opportunities, while the Jihadi lifestyle offers them heaven in the after life and dignity and importance in the current. But it is more important to understand that this PakArmy's Mujahid Policy is an outcome of military strategy [whatever its domestic social consequences]. In the minds of Pakistani security establishment (army & intelligence), India constitutes the biggest threat and because India is a much larger country, it can not be countered through conventional weapons – Indian navy being 40 times the Pakistan Navy, its army much larger in size and its Air force at least 10 years ahead in technology. Thus the only way to counter India is either through Nuclear Weapons or the Mujahid (an independent non-state actor whose actions are not legally owned by the State). Given Pakistan's area can be targeted by Indians in a first nuclear strike, Pakistan needs the strategic depth of Afghanistan to be able to respond. Thus a friendly (ideologically aligned & dependent) government in Afghanistan is Pakistan's (PakMilitary defined) geo-strategic requirement⁹. Thus a covert war continues through non-state actors (Mujahid) and intelligence agencies (ISI & RAW) in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Baluchistan and now FATA.

As argued earlier, the domestic consequences of PakArmy's military strategy which became State policy in the 1980s and continued irrespective of military dictatorship or civilian rule have been a nourishment to and sponsorship of religious orthodoxy, fundamentalism, Islamism and militancy. It is mind boggling as to why this strategy continues because it has left deep socio-economic scars on the country, with no chance to militarily compete with India other than US Aid. Even the biggest pie that the PakArmy gets from State budget can not compete with India's flourishing economy. Instead it has changed the complexion of a once peaceful society.

The struggle within religion

Pakistan is about 70% Sunni and 30% Shia. But within the cultural space, a more apt division would be between the mystical Sufi and Orthodox branches. The popular religion of the region is rural with its roots in the Sufi tradition but the orthodoxy (primarily urban) has constantly gained ground with increased urbanization and control of the mosque infrastructure. Other than the Sunni-Shia divide, the Sunnis themselves are divided into various sects though the State has given patronage to the Deobandi & Wahabi sects (who consider music to be against Islam) at the expense of Barelvis (mildest form of Sunni orthodoxy most attuned to the popular religion accepting Sufi thought as part of their religious tradition and owning the Qawwali & Kafi musical traditions). All the money that poured in for jihad since the start of the Afghan war has gone to setup a Wahabi-Deobandi infrastructure and all of Jihadi leadership belongs to these sects. Both Shias and Barelvis have bore the brunt of this State patronage as Deobandi-Wahabi sects are vehemently anti Shia while Wahabis even consider Barelvi practices as idolatry. After seeing a complete downslide of their interests, the Shias formed a militant organization in the 1980s though they are still usually the first target of Talibanization followed by the Barelvis.

⁸ ibid

⁹ A friend who had been part of the armed forces, had taught at the National War College articulated this rational military strategy to put the pieces together

Barelvis also created a militant organization ‘Sunni Tehreek’ though most of its leadership was killed in a single 2006 bomb blast in Karachi. Though both a Barelvi and Shia party were part of the religious alliance MMA, the two ‘religious’ political parties (JUI-F & JI) that formed the crux of the 2002-07 government in Frontier & Baluchistan – two provinces adjacent to Afghanistan are both close to the Deobandi school. The Islamic studies curriculum introduced by the military dictator in the 1980s again was Deobandi and makes no mention of Sufi thought primarily because JI had partnered with the dictator. Similarly the ‘Islamic’ injunctions introduced into Law during these times were again Wahabi-Deobandi inspired. Overall the complexion of Pakistani society especially urban areas has changed over the last 30 years with Deobandi-Wahadi strain of orthodoxy making huge inroads in the cultural space owing to State patronage and foreign & domestic funding.

In the socio-cultural realm, The Tableeghi Jamaat (TJ), a peaceful, apolitical missionary Islamic group which organizes the largest gathering of Muslims after the Haj pilgrimage in a small town in Pakistan needs to be mentioned. It attracts 1 million faithful to its 3 day yearly gathering and though all Muslims are welcome, the TJ itself follows the Deobandi school of thought and has received logistical support from the State since the 1980s. TJ has been instrumental in spreading religiosity in society through its people to people outreach which outweighs any other social or political group. It is also credited with installing religious dogma¹⁰ at street crossings, street light poles and trees along canals. But more importantly it is accredited with converting what little minorities Pakistan has and creating born again Muslims among army officers, popular musicians and cricket players among others. Though an apolitical organization, its sessions have been attended by four previous chiefs of the ISI in a personal capacity. While Gen. Javed Nasir, an active TJ member needs a special mention as he ran the ISI with a missionary zeal but more importantly because he was appointed by a civilian Prime Minister of a centre right party. The TJ was first introduced to the Army by the fundamentalist military dictator who allowed TJ to preach in Pakistan Military Academy till 1984. Though a peaceful organization, TJ provides a space for Jihadis to recruit as it attracts men looking for self-identity, renewal and fulfillment, giving them an obscurest fundamentalist and self aggrandizing approach to religion. Once self superiority over all other religious interpretations is accepted, one only needs to be convinced of a different tactical method for missionary work – violence. Though TJ members have warned new comers against militant invitations within the group, publications of Jihadi groups such as Jaish Muhammed (a Deobandi group) have been circulated informally at TJ gatherings and researched cases of British Pakistanis involved in terror acts have been traced to their association with the TJ earlier in life. Edict

Religiosity and religious expression has generally increased in Pakistani society irrespective of sect or religion. One sees Barelvi organizations also supporting a particular dressing marked by the green turban. Similarly one sees women increasingly supporting a black veil (burqa) which is orthodoxy

¹⁰ An established doctrine held by a religion. In this context, it is writing the names of Allah, the 1st Kalma or other Arabic verses. The point being that rather than concentrating/discussing the principles, ethics, values and meanings articulated by Islam, instead concentration is just on rituals (Namaz, Roza, Hajj etc.). A lack of discussion/debate has led to everything about Islam being sacred to the point that even Muslim history has been made sacred. Even among the educated, Quran is read in Arabic which no one understands, while at functions Quranic verses (Qirat) are never translated. While fundamentalists & Islamists argue that Islam is a code of life, they are not willing to reinterpret the Quran to gain answers for issues faced in the 21st century because reinterpretation requires in depth knowledge and debate which is an anathema to dogma. It is in their interest to keep everything about Islam sacred meaning that their own interpretation of Islam becomes sacred. Thus those who challenge their interpretation automatically challenge Islam and can be easily countered through a religious edict (fatwa) labeling them as infidels. For the State not to curtail religious edicts (fatwas) or take action against the edict giver allows a parallel judicial system, especially after Council of Islamic Ideology comprising of Islamic scholars already exists in an advisory role to the parliament. Thus even though religious opinion is institutionalized in the State, independent decrees in the name of Islam are still not curtailed.

inspired rather than a chadar (a traditional form used to cover the head). The society has become more outwardly religious which is counter to the folk lore of the region. The great Sufi tradition usually credited with spreading Islam in this region through the personal character of the de-classed Sufi, who lived among the people and showed them the way to human dignity and communion with God, while challenging both the Hindu and Islamic orthodox narratives. This syncretic and inclusive religious tradition still exists in the landscape through the popular religious tradition of the majority and the dominant literary and musical tradition of the vernacular (Punjabi, Saraiki, Sindhi & even Pushto). But the Pakistani State's use of religion for political purposes has persecuted it as a minority in an ideological state.

Though one constantly hears the epoch division of the 1980 as the break between the Liberal Secular and the Islamist, the growth of fundamentalism, intolerance, extremism and later religious militancy have been in the making since the creation of the Pakistani State when religious identity was used for mass mobilization giving rise to a State for the Muslims but also to a religious cleansing of minorities. Rather than stemming the tide of religious exclusivity as argued by the founder in a speech to the constituent assembly on Sept 11, 1948¹¹, the parliament passed the Objectives Resolution¹² in 1949 inserting religion into statecraft, thus giving weight to the argument that Pakistan was created for Islam rather than for the sociopolitical rights of the Indian Muslims. Further support to the right wing came with Pakistan's participation in the Western American block during the Cold War. This bulwark against communism was financially supported by the 'enlightened' West in military matters and in propagation of right wing ideological discourses to counter left leaning students, writers, intellectuals and trade unions. Additionally, the centralized bureaucratic structure of the State used religious identity as the binding force for a multinational state persecuting provincial nationalist parties who organized citizens based on language and cultural identity for greater provincial autonomy.

But a friend argues that the 1965 Pak-India war was the watershed which started the Pak-India Cold War. Following the war, both States devised their policies with an anti-other bias. Pakistani State consciously inculcated Anti-India feeling, soon using religion to heighten Anti-Hindu feelings and equating India with Hindu. The State removed Design (art) from primary and secondary levels, changed Religious Studies to Islamic Studies, extended Islamic Studies from 8th to 10th grade and made it mandatory. By 1979, Geography and History were replaced by Pakistan Studies which inculcated Pakistan's Islamic identity. Thus Pakistan's history started with the arrival of the first Muslim Arab conqueror in the 8th century rather than the 5000 B.C. Indus Valley civilization. Further in the 90s, both Islamic Studies and Pakistan Studies were made compulsory till 14th grade and even the natural sciences were given an Islamic angle.¹³ Thus the argument against madrassas¹⁴ for brainwashing children is incomplete as the State itself is complicit in sponsoring sectarianism and narrow minded through State dictated curriculum in public or private schools.

Even after the utter defeat of two nation theory (Muslims & Hindus being two separate nations thus a need for a separate Muslim homeland) with separation of East Pakistan into Bangladesh and the

¹¹you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed, that has nothing to do with the business of the State. .. and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State

¹² Sovereignty belongs to Allah and delegated to the State through its people. It is to be exercised within the limits prescribed by Allah

¹³ Amir Riaz's study of Pakistan's Education Policy

¹⁴ They cater to the poorest as they provide both room & board along with solely religious teaching. Most are non militant but the outlook of students is sectarian.

preceding rise of secular socialist forces; the right wing was still placated by inserting the Objectives Resolution as a preamble to the 1973 constitution and changing the country's name to 'Islamic Republic'. Additionally, the left leaning government of Z.A. Bhutto further conceded space to right wing anti Ahmedi rioters by mandating the Ahmedi sect as Non-Muslim clearly destroying legal separation of State and religion. Thus State sanctioned Ahmedi persecution in the 70s, overt persecution by extremist elements started in the 80s supported by misuse of Blasphemy Law¹⁵, followed by random acts of violence, the last happening a couple of months back when three Ahmedis were killed after a 'religious' scholar sanctioned them killable on the country's most popular cable station. Thus the current predicament is only a continuation of the trends that have long been at play only to have aggravated by overt State patronization of orthodoxy and creation of the Jihadi infrastructure since the 1980s.

The above argued analysis is a common feature of the Liberals while the Marxists also concentrate on the criminal economic structure which leaves no shortage of the poor to be exploited in a country of 170million, but both miss a key aspect- that of identity formation which encapsulates the majority rather than the minority constituting the Orthodox, the Islamists and the significantly small but powerful militant Islamists.

Language and identity formation

The Punjab province makes up 65% of Pakistan by population dominating the State, making a mockery of the federal structure and thus leading to nationalist currents in the other three provinces. Centre and Northern Punjab are the most developed areas of Pakistan. They make up the core of PakArmy (65% of Army is Punjabi in which representation of Southern Punjab is small) just as they had done during British times when Punjabi Muslims made up more than 25% of all British Indian Army. While being the most powerful indigenous group both in British India and now in Pakistan, the Punjab¹⁶ has had never had its own language taught in schools or used as State language. In contrast Sindhi, Pushto and Baluchi are taught at the primary level in respective provinces. The state language of the Punjab has been Urdu (the language marker of Muslim identity in India) since 1852 continuing with the creation of Pakistan when Urdu became the sole national language¹⁷ while most official work is conducted in English. Though Punjabi still dominates the streets as a spoken language, almost no academic or literary work has been published in the language giving Punjabi the stamp of the language of the poor and the uneducated. Thus middle class urban Punjabis speak in Urdu with their children while the upper classes prefer English.

This relegation of Punjabi to third rate status leading to a lack of academic acceptance and subsequent work in Punjabi has had drastic consequences. First, It has ruptured the traditional inbuilt resistance to religious orthodoxy among the urban educated who both dominate the State as well as culture. Sufism challenges orthodoxy at its root within the belief based framework of the populace, more powerful than the rational, secular, rights based framework limited to those groomed in Western Enlightenment literature. But Sufism also provides room for multiple identities, specifically challenging the all encompassing Muslim identity of Islamism which looks to the Middle East for its fulfillment. Sufis were rooted in the land, lived among and talked of the poor, adopted their language and separated one's calling of finding God from both the scriptures (controlled by Mullahs, Brahmins & Qazis) and

¹⁵ Blasphemy Law was passed by the fundamentalist military dictator in the 80s. Under it any person who denigrates the memory of the Prophet Muhammad PBUH can be subject to the Death Penalty

¹⁶ The Garrison State: Military, Government and Society in Colonial Punjab, 1849-1947, Tan Tai Yong (Sage, 2005)

¹⁷ This imposition had led to riots in East Pakistan and was a important spark towards the independence of Bangladesh

the location (Hajj, Kabaa etc.) with the Wahdatul Wojoood¹⁸ theological position. It is for this reason that even after religious State's decades long struggle to create Hindu as the other, Sufis & Bhagtis still manage to bring them together under this shared tradition of South Asia. Second, because language is key to ethnicity based nationalism, Punjabis seemed have sacrificed their distinct cultural identity to the State defined all encompassing Muslim identity for material benefit. It is for this very reason that Punjabis can not relate to ethnic nationalism of own and other three provinces, instead viewing nationalist parties with distrust to the extend of considering them un-Islamic and thus un-patriotic. Third, language has pronounced class and knowledge demarcations with society divided into English, Urdu and Punjabi with their own closed knowledge space leading to cultural division and alienation. It is thus important to note that NGOs rights based discourse with its Western roots may be more alienated from the majority compared to the Islamist discourse coaxed in religious terms.

In Pakistan, one might hear Sufi music with its critique of orthodoxy but the written form that currently dominates knowledge frameworks instead of the historical oral knowledge transmission does not allow Sufi thought to make an impact. Lack of language skills has not allowed recent generations to read and explore Punjabi literature, which is predominantly Sufi in character. Additionally academic research, analysis, and government policy making is conducted in English; literature is mostly written in Urdu (in Punjab), while Punjabi stays the language of mythology, folk tales and popular culture. While the English educated elite gets jobs in multinationals and the world market, Urdu speaking middle classes vie for bureaucracy and domestic market and the vernacular speaking lower classes succumb to low paying contract or daily wage. It is because of this separation of economics and social discourses that none of the intellectual frameworks lead to empowerment but instead increase the divergence of cultural trends¹⁹.

Shedding the Punjabi lingual and ethno-cultural identity, the liberal segments of society follow the West in their quest for individual freedom, while in their reaction to rapidly changing surroundings and influx of media in their homes, the conservatives adopt a stricter form of Islam imported from the deserts of Arabia. As the public space get cluttered by mass advertising in the age of high capitalism, one also sees competing commercialization of religion with public display of one's faith on houses, billboards and cars. But the third way steeped in Punjabi cultural tradition critiquing both the material exhibitionism of individuality and of its brutal restriction has instead been orphaned by the Pakistani ideological state. Rather than evolving a socio-cultural discourse rooted in tradition, the State in its centralizing feature adopted religion (Islam being common among ~95% of the population) as the basis of discourse and identity formation because traditions differed across the vast cultural diversity of the State's territory. This left religion as the only force to counter external cultural assault in this era of globalization. But unfortunately even religion has been transformed owing to Saudi funding of Wahabi institutions and State's sponsorship of Deobandi-Wahabi missionary, political and militant groups. This has left no choice for the populace but between McDonalization or Talibanization.

¹⁸ Unity of Being: All things exist within God, thus God is found in every thing.

¹⁹ Empowerment would happen if the population is well versed in all three languages or if translated discourses of all three languages are available in others. Without it, three disjointed discourses are present with no linkages among them. A lay person picks one while the intellectuals (new generation urban groomed are limited to one - English) may be limited to two. Eg. the possible reach of this article is limited to 5-10% of the population which can read English in Pakistan. If translated in Urdu, another 30% can be possibly reached. If written in Urdu, a significant portion of those groomed in English will choose not to read it because of reading speed and vice versa.

Deep State, the superstructure of the most powerful actor

The post colonial independent state rather than decolonizing its institutional and societal structures instead continued with the same military, civil bureaucratic structures while entrenching the local power of the landed elite. The State came into existence with an unnatural colonial boundary of the Durand Line in the West (Afghan-Pak border) and competing claims on Kashmir in the East with India, requiring the sole commonality of religion to be used for patriotic association with the State.²⁰ The initial creation of the State steeped in religious rhetoric only gave way to institutionalization of religion within state apparatus over time. Orthodoxy thus naturally gained as the State clamped down on all other citizen identities- mullah became a partner against communism, Islamic identity against the ethno-national identity of multiple nations constituting the territory of the State, Urdu as national language against respective mother tongues and Hindu India as the arch enemy against Islamic Pakistan.

Perceiving multiple threats, the competing interests of politicians was no match for the State's colonial bureaucratic structure which eventually became a power unto itself, earlier the civil bureaucrat dominated though later civil bureaucracy grudgingly became the junior partner of the military establishment. With military receiving 70-80% of the State budget after independence, 65% in 1957, owning 12 million acres of land (12% of all state owned land), its organized institutional capacity overwhelmed all other sectors of society leading to the military defining the National Interest without trusting any one else. Its thinking, strategy steeped in statist (State as compared to people oriented) discourse, culture increasingly dominated by the alienated Punjabi; the lingering Islamists trends eventually came together to form the 'Deep State' under the fundamentalist military dictator. Led by Pak-Army and intelligence, the Deep State uses mullah-orthodoxy as an instrument to restrict citizen identity to religion, helping recruitment efforts for the Jihadi industry, which became the most important strategic sector of the Deep State and the fastest growing services sector of the State since the 1980s. The intelligence outfits particularly ISI combine intelligence and military operations thus becoming the judge and the executioner. Its domestic political analysis wing started in the 1970 and has been instrumental in fixing various elections and bringing down civilian governments. Though it achieved autonomy in the 1980s with unfettered funds from CIA and public-private Saudi money, its current financial strength is unknown. But of course the \$10B that has come into Pakistan through open channels since 2001 is still not accounted for.

Deep State has dictated the State's Kashmir, Afghanistan and Nuclear policy since 1979 without ever being questioned by immature civilian governments, either because political parties are its creation or sponsored (JI, JUI, PML), others compromise before coming to power (PPP) or are forced to compromise in power (ANP). Deep State can not be termed Establishment (catch phrase for the permanent power clique) because its superstructure combines the constructed ideology of the State of Pakistan to capture the patriotic mind; considering this ideology has a religious orientation, it further captures the religious mind in the name of Islam; State's economic resources through huge unaccountable military budget can be used to create non-state institutional infrastructure and assets spanning political parties, Jihadis to support the religio-political ideological line; promotion takes place through paid journalists and a curtailed media (all news from Baluchistan, FATA are provided by Inter Services Public Relations – ISPR, a military media cell instead of independent journalists. No discussion on Jihadi-military nexus is possible in the electronic media); if somehow the social engineering fails, the army is always there to defend the ideological frontier having taken oath. If

²⁰ Against Pushtun nationalists to counter the threat of Pukhtunistan and to highlight the commonality of religion between Pakistan and Kashmir

genuinely threatened the 'Deep State' does not shy from using raw power in all its domains, though it is seldom needed because ISI's domestic political wing usually has enough information to blackmail or threaten. If that does not work out, the preferred means of action is Missing Persons- citizens picked up without a trace and no acknowledgement by the State. Even the Chief Justice of the country was put under house arrest and not reinstated till a people's movement forced it, because one of his crimes was to demand the State to present thousands of missing persons in court, majority are which are Baloch nationalists.

The impact of social engineering can be judged by philanthropy numbers collected by Aga Khan Institute which estimates that out of the \$1.1 Billion donations given in Pakistan, 94% went to religious institutions. It was only in 2002 that the State banned donation collection boxes of Jihadi groups from shops though friends' argue that unmarked donation boxes still exist. In 1947 there were only 137 madrassas²¹ in Pakistan, the number now is in the thousands as there was a 3.5 times increase from 1975 to 1996 owing to disbursement of Zakat²² funds starting in 1980 as well external funding. Of the 2,463 madrassas assessed in 1996, 1,700 received funding from outside the country. Deep State's direct economic cost to the nation comes in the form of historical military budgetary allocations of 53% in 1965, and ~40% in 2009 (not including hidden costs) which going into unproductive investments had led to no long term job creation. In bad times, key assets of the Deep State are forced to live indoors lest they spill the beans to an intrusive international media. But when the pressure subsides, the likes of Masood Azhar (chief of Jaish-e-Mohammad released through a plane hijacking affair from India) and Hafiz Saeed (chief JamatudDawa and earlier Lashkar-e-Taiba) are free to travel in Land Cruisers with their private armies and speak at large gatherings. Still Omar Sheikh, the British Pakistani Jihadi of the plane hijacking and later Daniel Pearl fame has to stay behind bars not accessible to any one.²³ While the leaders of Deep State (the military officer class) retire with a good package from the State (Pervez Musharraf's legally acquired: 5 housing plots in Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad, agricultural land in Bahawalpur and two other plots) later staying as employees or investors in Military Incorporated, one of the largest industrial conglomerates with estimated market value of \$20Billion (2007)²⁴.

The Deep State comprises of leaders of the 6th largest army of the world, around 800,000+ with 550,000 regular forces. Its ideological instruments are the Mullah and Islamists while kamikazes are made up of Jihadis. The non-state elements have gained wealth and power but their focus is on implementing their ideological agenda with or without public support. What PakArmy, the patron saint of the Deep State fails to understand is that its Mujahid military strategy has literally destroyed the internal social fabric of Pakistani society. To have a friendly government in Afghanistan and to bring India to a negotiating table on Kashmir has given rise to sectarian warfare, has abetted the rise of the hard core PakTaliban in Pukhtoonkha (NWFP) who slaughter humans like animals, while the built Jihadi infrastructure in Hazara, Saraiki Wasaib and even parts of Central Punjab just needs a spark to start an uncontrollable mayhem. Some argue that linkages between PakTaliban and other Jihadi groups are already bearing fruit as a percentage of PakTaliban are from Punjab. But PakArmy has not learnt

²¹ They cater to the poorest as they provide both room & board along with solely religious teaching. Most are non militant but the outlook of students is sectarian.

²² The religious wealth tax that the fundamentalist dictator made mandatory during his rule but was challenged by the Shias. It is now automatically deducted from bank savings unless one gives in writing not to.

²³ Both Masood Azhar and Omar Sheikh were part of the deal in which hijacked plane passengers were traded for three Jihadis in Kabul. Both were given welcome in Pakistan and Masood Azhar took out large scale processions in Southern Punjab. Members of his organization are stated to be participating in PakTaliban activities as casualty of militants usually includes men & boys from Southern Punjab.

²⁴ Military Inc., Ayesha Siddiqua (Oxford University Press, 2007)

from its mistake. It can not conceive a clean break from the Jihadis till its policy objectives are met even if the whole country slowly falls to extremism and anarchy. It is but a matter of time before the ideological section of the Deep State takes over its master, as former assets have long started treading their own independent path. Without dismantling the Jihadi Infrastructure and rehabilitating its members, terrorism will continue unabated, while without dismantling the Deep State, the state of war will continue.

Options for evolutionary change are limited because State and societal elements outside the Deep State are either co-opted, corrupt, disorganized or disempowered. The current Prime minister, Foreign Minister, Commerce Minister of the 'left of centre' ruling party are all direct descendants of Sufis but their ancestors were co-opted by the State centuries ago. These pir-feudals (Feudal Saints) who control the peasant both economically and spiritually have ruled their fiefs for the last four centuries in deference to the central state (Mughals, British and now Army), theirs specifically but general feudal power only increasing over time. Such disparity where few families own 1000s of acres while more than 50% of the population is landless also cuts across other economic and urban sectors. Thus the vast pool of the dispossessed only increasing with rise in population to 300 million by 2045, with no hope of wealth redistribution, in a policy framework dominated by the Deep State and living with non-existent State services due to corruption and incompetence can only give rise to reactionary movements.

To make matters worse, the recent big boon to the Deep State has been the American 'War on Terror' which rather than resolving conflicts of developing nation states generating terrorism (Palestine, Kashmir, Moros, Chechnya, Tamils, Balochistan, Kurd), further destabilized fragile states in the name of counter terrorism. It gave a blanket check to States to clamp down on internal resistance labeling all dissidents, terrorists. This is not to disregard that the various national independence struggles did not have a militant, terrorist element but to argue that these struggles have their root in the unresolved intra and inter political disputes of evolving nation states. It is this very character of immature nation states that has given rise to terrorist organizations. Thus war (State terrorism) without complete genocide of a population can never solve the problem of terrorism, but only a resolution of these conflicts through strong diplomatic leadership. Arguments for nation building through war, threat and direct outside involvement: promoting democracy, countering religious extremism, destroying terrorists (if 'terrorists' are part parcel of societies) are misplaced without including all stake holders in a society. Societies evolve from within, incorporating or shedding foreign influences on their own terms, taking their own time. American war in Somalia through Ethiopian proxy excluding the Council of Islamic Courts, in Afghanistan excluding the Taliban, in Iraq excluding the Sunnis, in Palestine excluding Hamas and in Lebanon excluding Hezbollah can never lead to nation building but instead to more extremism, radicalism and terrorism.

Deep State is peculiar in the sense that it is more in tuned with groups fighting for national survival even though it is running the State, giving rise to terrorist movements in order to counter neighboring States. Its incomplete project seems to require a theocracy in Pakistan with Kashmir as a part in addition to an ideologically aligned Pakistan dominated government in Afghanistan. Continued foreign presence on Pakistan's Western front (Afghanistan) thus leads to further insecurity for the Deep State, which now needs its ideological instruments, the Jihadis/Taliban more than ever to counter arch enemy India and ideological nemesis America. It only gets strengthened internally by exploiting the mantra of 'War on Terror' – by patriots as a war to take away nuclear weapons, by Islamists as a war against Islam, by the military in their weapons shopping spree to keep a pace with India, while Jihadis/Taliban glow in their role as the new anti imperialists.

Thus winning the current Afghan regional war has little to do with fighting terrorism in Pakistan but with finding a diplomatic solution to Afghanistan with all parties involved including the Afghan Taliban along with a concrete timeline of the return of American and NATO forces. But it risks shifting the theatre of war to Kashmir as that issue stays unresolved. It is thus imperative that India & Pakistan end their Cold War by resolving their conflicts especially competing interests in Kashmir, diplomatically through an open dialogue, else intelligence and Mujahid wars will continue. Pakistanis need international help only in matters of international diplomacy to resolve Afghanistan and Kashmir as this would injure the Deep State. But the challenge to dismantle the ideological, sociopolitical and economic structures of the Deep State has to come from within, without US' hegemonic interference and without project oriented foreign funded development. Only a maturing political process leading to an indigenous political movement can shatter the Deep State, else while Pakistanis who currently live under the shadow of generals, feudals, tribal sardars and mafias will continue living under the Taliban. The real battle in Pakistan is with the Deep State which has hijacked the State of Pakistan. Though this is politically debated by smaller nationalities (Sindhis, Baluchis, nationalist Pathan & Saraiki, Others), it is the majority Punjabi and Urdu Speaking nationalities whose patriotism needs to be de-linked from the Deep State to an inclusive decentralized non-ideological State.